Managerial Responsiveness to Union and Nonunion Worker Voice in Britain

Over the last two decades, there has been a switch in British workplaces away from union voice and representative worker voice more generally toward direct employee involvement and nonunion representative forms of voice. This article assesses the implications of this switch for the effectiveness of worker voice, as measured by employee perceptions of managerial responsiveness. In general, perceptions of managerial responsiveness are better among employees with nonunion voice than they are among employees with union voice.     

A pilot study of venture capital investment appraisal in Australia

Illiquidity, volatile returns and lack of information are sources of the high risk that characterise the investments made by venture capitalists (VCs). Despite the importance of such investments in the contemporary business and technological environment, and the associated risk-related difficulties, little Australian research has been conducted into the decision-making processes of VCs. This study investigates both the investment process and some of the strategies used by VCs for reducing selected risks. The specific source of risk examined is information asymmetry, which is caused by lack of information on the part of the VCs, and which can lead to the added risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. Four Australian VC firms were surveyed using a comprehensive open-ended questionnaire. A manual content analysis was employed to analyse the questionnaire responses. Consistent with prior research, the Australian VCs sampled are found to employ Berger and Udell' three steps of investment: selection, contracting and monitoring. Furthermore, the semi-formal selection step of the investment process is found to consist of three distinct stages: deal sourcing, screening and evaluation. A number of techniques are used to minimise the risks of information asymmetry during the screening and evaluation stages, as well as during the later steps of contracting and monitorin.     

The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms

This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era.     

Logistics: The nuts and bolts of moving products

Donald F. Wood, Anthony P. Barone, Paul R. Murphy, and Daniel L. Wardlow. 2002. International Logistics (2nd ed.). New York: AMACOM Books. ISBN: 0814406661. Kent N. Gourdin. 2000. Global Logistics Management. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, ISBN: 1557868832.     

Worker voice,managerial response and labour productivity: an empirical investigation

This article investigates the relationship between worker voice practices, employee perceptions of managerial responsiveness and labour productivity. It argues that managerial responsiveness is a critical but under‐investigated variable in the study of the relationship between worker voice, human resource management and performance. Our results suggest that managerial responsiveness to worker voice does lead to superior labour productivity. However, this relationship is only found in non‐union workplaces and there is little relationship between formal voice regime and productivity. One important implication of this finding is that more responsive management will result in improved productivity, so policy interventions should focus on how to motivate managers to become more responsive to their employees.     

Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation

Housing markets are thin, and consumer search for housing is costly, time consuming, and risky. Mismatches between tenants and dwellings are common in a laissez-faire market. There are scale economies in accumulating tenants and houses and then matching them up to improve welfare. In many European countries, some housing is rent controlled and rationed by public centralized matching. Waiting time, risk in rationing, and risk in matching are costs that arise from such regulation. We show that welfare improvements over laissez-faire occur if gains from centralized matching can offset the decrease in housing quality, the possible increase in waiting times, and the risks in rationing induced by rent controls. Under regulation, there is a welfare maximizing partition of the stock into free and controlled markets; and contrary to observed practice, it is often welfare improving to set controlled rents above (not below) laissez-faire, which increases the supply offered for centralized matching and the opportunity for a better match.